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1 p. 4:21-23). In response to the unequivocal proof of continuous publication, plaintiff Mark Golob
2 claims only that “After that letter [replying to his attorney demand letter in 2011] Sean Kelly did
3 in fact take down the content related to me from his websites including the statements that I had a
4 ‘checkered past.’” (Golob Decl. Para. 8).

5 But the letters between Golob’s attorney and Sean Kelly do not establish that the
6 “checkered past” and “history of litigation” statements were taken down. (Sean Kelly Decl.
7 3/13/14, Paras. 16-24, Exs. F-H; Sean Kelly Reply Decl., 4/1/14, Paras. 8-22, Exs. M-O). Those
8 letters instead addressed a different asserted statement about an affiliation between Mark Golob
9 and a different company, Top Doc America. (*Ibid*).

10 Unlike plaintiff Mark Golob, defendant Sean Kelly has personal knowledge as the owner
11 operator that his blog continuously posted the “checkered past” and “history of litigation”
12 statements. (Sean Kelly Decl., 3/13/14, Paras. 2, 16). Mark Golob does not state he operated the
13 blog, nor even state what he did, and when he did it, to “monitor” the internet and particularly the
14 Kelly blog. Due to this new contention, Sean Kelly reiterated his continuous posting of the two
15 alleged defamatory statements on his blog, and obtained snapshots from the Wayback Machine
16 archive, establishing that the two alleged defamatory statements were posted on the internet on
17 December 27, 2011, September 3, 2012, and February 27, 2013, all times when Golob somehow
18 claims they were not. (Kelly Reply Decl., 04/01/14, Paras. 18-22, Ex. O).

19 The final response of plaintiff Mark Golob regarding timing is his new claim that a re-
20 publication occurred “in or about January of 2014” with “the statements that I had a checkered
21 past and a history of litigation out of the body of the article and made it a headline.” (Golob Decl.
22 Para. 8). But Golob does not attach the alleged new blog posting to his declaration. In contrast,
23 defendant Sean Kelly has expressly denied there was any such new posting, but rather there were
24 original postings in August of 2008. (Sean Kelly Reply Decl., Paras. 23-26, Ex. P).

25 C. Additional Factual Background

26 In his declaration, Mr. Golob does not address, much less deny, the myriad of accusations
27 by former franchisees, customers and business associates against him or his companies with one
28 exception. Mr. Golob admits the existence of numerous health care industry lawsuits, including
by reciting dismissals and settlements of many such lawsuits. (Golob Decl. Para. 14).

1 **II. LEGAL ARGUMENT**

2 A. Overview of the California Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to Strike

3 Plaintiff Mark Golob does not dispute the overview of the Anti-SLAPP statute, but instead
4 incorrectly contends that the statute does not apply and that plaintiff has shown a probability of
5 success on the merits of its two claims for relief. Plaintiff Golob is wrong on both arguments.

6 B. The Challenged Conduct of Defendant Sean Kelly Involves the Exercise of Free
7 Speech and First Amendment Rights Within the Anti-SLAPP Statute

8 Plaintiff Golob fails to address each of the multiple subparts of the anti-SLAPP statute
9 detailed in defendant Kelly’s opening memo. Instead, plaintiff Golob argues that the matters
10 discussed in the blog are not of public concern, now involve a retired private person, and involve
11 commercial speech. These arguments are incorrect, both legally and factually, and do not apply to
12 all three subparts of the anti-SLAPP statute either equally or at all.

13 Plaintiff Mark Golob fails to address the first basis asserted by defendant Sean Kelly for
14 application of the anti-SLAPP statute. Namely, the blog articles involve written statements made
15 “in connection with” [issues] under consideration or review [by an] executive or judicial body or
16 any other official proceeding authorized by law.” Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16(e)(2);
17 *see, Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co.* (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1048-49. In our system of
18 governance, comments about court cases and individuals involved therein are *per se* public issues.
19 Even the inaccurate Golob opposition declaration admits to being involved in multiple litigations
20 while placing his spin that these lawsuits were dismissed or settled. (Golob Decl., Para. 14).
21 Finally when conduct falls within 425.16(e)(2), it is not necessary to establish that the conduct
22 related to a public issue. *Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity* (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106,
23 1118.

24 Here the blog article contains discourse in a “public forum” including newspapers,
25 newsletters, and blogs, about matters of “public concern,” a second independent anti-SLAPP
26 basis under Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16(e)(3). Plaintiff Mark Golob does not contest
27 that the Unhappy Franchisee forum and blog is a public forum. *See, Damon v. Ocean Hills
28 Journalism Club* (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 469, 474-76 (newsletter is public forum); *Summit Bank v.
Rogers* (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 669, 693 (internet message board is public forum). Instead
plaintiff Golob labels the reporting about him and his companies as not a public concern
especially, he argues, because he claims to no longer be selling franchises.

In his opposition, plaintiff Golob cites two cases seeking to determine public interest. The

1 first case involved efforts to enjoin tenants engaging in a free speech protest of bad business
2 behavior by a landlord, *Thomas v. Quintero* (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635. The Court of Appeal
3 found, as here, that the landlord businessman misconduct was in the “public interest.” The second
4 case, *Weinberg v. Feisel* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, sought to list factors showing the public
5 interest. But those factors, as well as the anti-SLAPP statutory mandate to be broadly construed,
6 all support finding the public interest and anti-SLAPP application herein.

7 The Sean Kelly blog article was not mere curiosity but part of a national blog site on
8 franchising problems involving hundreds of thousands of franchisees with dozens in the Butterfly
9 Fitness franchise system. Kelly Decl., 03/31/14, Paras. 1-15). And the Sean Kelly blog article
10 directly related to problems in franchising, an area of repeated legislative and judicial scrutiny. In
11 *Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy* (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1704, the Court of Appeal spelled out
12 this area of public interest:

13 The relationship between franchisor and franchisee is a significant issue,
14 and growing more important each year. As recently explained,
15 “Franchising is rapidly becoming the dominant mode of distributing
16 goods and services in the United States. According to the International
17 Franchise Association, one out of every twelve businesses in the United
18 States is a franchise. In addition, franchise systems now employ over
19 eight million people and account for approximately forty-one percent of
20 retail sales in the United States. Even conservative estimates predict that
21 franchised businesses will be responsible for over fifty percent of retail
22 sales by the year 2000.”

23 *Id.*, 43 Cal.App.4th at 1715.

24 Contrary to plaintiff Golob’s arguments, and not even mentioned in his opposition, the
25 California legislature, courts and newspapers have all found fraudulent and abusive franchisors to
26 be of public concern. California has enacted laws to protect franchisees in the offer and sale of
27 franchises and other aspects of the franchise relationship. Corporations Code Section 31000, *et.*
28 *seq.*, Business & Professions Code Section 20000, *et. seq.*, *see also*, 16 CFR Part 436.1 (FTC
Franchise Rule); *see, Keating v. Superior Court* (182) 31 Cal.3d 584, 593-600, *rev. on other*
grounds, Southland Corp. v. Keating (1984) 465 U.S. 1, 104 S.Ct. 852 (“The California
Legislature has determined that franchisees are in need of special protection in dealing with
franchisors.” *Id.*, 31 Cal.3d at 5943-594). Stories about unfair and abusive behavior by
franchisors, much like securities abuses that the franchise laws were modeled after, abound in
public print press such as Business Week, and the Wall Street Journal. Defendant Golob also
incorrectly suggests that the blog is commercial speech citing *Kasky v. Nike, Inc.* (2002) 27

1 Cal.4th 939. Although the distinction is not relevant to the conclusions herein, the blog articles of
2 Sean Kelly about franchising are reporting and not commercial speech, i.e. not “speech proposing
3 a commercial transaction.” *Ibid*, 27 Cal.4th at 253 (citations omitted).

4 Here the publication by Sean Kelly was as a journalist blogger, not as an individual
5 seeking to advance his own interest or litigation. (Sean Kelly Decl., 03/13/14, Paras. 2-4, 9, 16).
6 The publication here about Mr. Golob and his businesses including Linda Evans Fitness outlets
7 and Butterfly Fitness franchises involved myriads of customers and franchisees. (Kelly Decl.,
8 3/13/14, Paras. 12-20, Exs. C-G). Multiple area franchisees filed a single complaint while six
9 were interviewed and described their problems and losses with Butterfly Fitness franchises.
10 (Kelly Decl., 03/13/14, Para. 14, Ex. E). The number of ongoing blog responses further reflect the
11 public concern over these issues. Golob himself was quoted in a national health club magazine,
12 and currently has a website lauding himself as founder of Linda Evans Fitness and Butterfly Life
13 Fitness. (Kelly Decl., 3/13/14, Para. 28, Ex. L; Kelly Reply Decl., Paras. 33-36, Ex. Q).

14 A final opposition argument, made without real direct legal authority, is that Mr. Golob is
15 no longer registered to sell franchises and is somehow retired. No court should award a party that
16 delays filing suit for years then claims he is no longer in the public eye, especially when he claims
17 the statute of limitations has not run during that long ago publication. Indeed, when the alleged
18 defamatory material was published in 2008, Mr. Golob and Butterfly Fitness were clearly still an
19 operating franchisor. (Kelly Decl., 03/13/14, Para. 16, Ex. F). Moreover Butterfly Life continued
20 until at least September of 2011, when it filed for bankruptcy. (Kelly Decl., 03/13/14, Para. 27,
21 Ex. K). Ultimately, Mr. Golob does not declare that he will not be involved in franchising in the
22 future, nor even that he is not in some other type of business. His very public website indicates
23 otherwise and injects his prior behavior back into the public arena. (Kelly Reply Decl., 4/01/14,
24 Para. 36, Ex. Q).

25 The third independent reason that the anti-SLAPP statute is triggered is the statutory
26 application to “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of ... the constitutional right of
27 free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” Code of Civil
28 Procedure Section 425.16(e)(4). News reporting is free speech within the protections of Code of
Civil Procedure Section 425.16. *American Humane Association v. Los Angeles Times
Commission* (2001) 92 Cal.App. 4th 10951104. The anti-SLAPP statute, including the scope of
“public interest” and “public issue,” is to be broadly construed. *See, Briggs v. Eden Council for
Hope & Opportunity*, (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1120-21. As detailed above ripping off health club

1 customers by closing and not refunding deposits, making phony earnings claims and not
2 supporting franchisees are both a public issue and an issue of public interest. The press and free
3 speech provide the public with information about bad business and bad government, the need for
4 legislative changes, and the need to reign in bad business behavior from Wall Street derivatives to
5 Bernie Madoffs and failed franchisors. Indeed, the press, including the Los Angeles Times, has
6 written about these health club and franchise businesses including with comments injected Mark
7 Golob. (Decl. of Sean Kelly, 03/13/14, Paras. 13, 28, Exs. D, L). Finally, to this day, Mark Golob
8 has a promotional website promoting his status as founder of Butterfly Fitness and Linda Evans
9 Fitness. (Sean Kelly Reply Decl., 04/01/14, Para. 36, Ex. Q).

9 C. Plaintiff Golob Cannot Show a Probability of Prevailing on Either of His Two
10 Causes of Action for Defamation and Negligent Misrepresentation

11 Plaintiff Mark Golob's claims must be stricken unless he presents evidence establishing a
12 probability that he will prevail on the merits. Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 (b)(1). A
13 plaintiff cannot simply rely on the allegations set forth in the complaint, nor can a court merely
14 accept those allegations. *Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim* (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 654-
15 56; *Bradbury v. Superior Court* (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1117; *see also, Robertson v.*
16 *Rodriguez* (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347, 359.

16 1. Plaintiff Golob Has Not Established Any Representations and Further
17 Cannot Establish that the Asserted Representations Are Actionable
18 Defamation or Negligent Misrepresentation

19 Plaintiff Golob in his complaint has claimed two asserted defamatory statements in a
20 written blog, but he has failed to offer the writing as evidence. Instead, Mr. Golob purports to
21 recite what he thinks the blog said in January of 2014. Golob Decl. Para. 8. Not only is this a
22 violation of the best evidence rule (which objections defendant Sean Kelly hereby asserts), but
23 also is hearsay, and not competent proof of a written statement. Evidence Code Sections 1500,
24 1501; *Von Brimer v. Whirlpool Corp.* (N.D. Cal. 1973) 362 F.Supp. 1182 ("The best evidence
25 rule mandates that in order to present secondary evidence of the contents of the original written
26 instrument, evidence of its loss, destruction, or unavailability must be presented." *Id.*, 362 F.Supp.
27 at 1187). For this reason alone, Mr. Golob has not shown a probability of prevailing on a
28 defamation claim as he has no proof of the alleged defamatory statements.

While plaintiff Golob has presented a claimed definition of the word "checkered past," he
has failed to establish that the statement by Sean Kelly was not an opinion. Even if Golob's
unattributed definition of "checkered past" from an unestablished source were used, the definition

1 calls for an opinion about character and quality. Here, the setting of this wording in the blog
2 article was classic lead in opinion followed by detailed statements. In particular, following the
3 “checkered past” statement the blog contained detailed verbatim statements first by Butterfly Life
4 franchisee Jeff Marks and later by six other Butterfly Life franchisees. Those interviews tell a tale
5 of franchisor unfair trade practices specifically, from which an experienced franchise professional
6 is entitled to provide his opinion under the first amendment. *See, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal*
7 *Co.*, (1990) 497 U.S. 1 (the First Amendment protects opinions and non-verifiable assertions of
8 fact); *Schuler v. McGraw-Hill Business Week Online* (D.N.M. 1997) 989 F.Supp. 1377.

9 Moreover, plaintiff Mark Golob fails to address this issue in his opposition because
10 another court has already addressed a checkered record statement. In *Schuler v. McGraw-Hill*
11 *Companies, Inc.*, *supra*, 989 F.Supp. 1377, a federal district court dismissed the defamation claim
12 finding that the checkered record phrase “unambiguously states an opinion, and, as such, is not
13 defamatory as a matter of law.” *Ibid.*, 989 F.Supp. at 1385. For this additional reason, plaintiff
14 Golob has failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits.

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2. Plaintiff Golob Has Failed to Establish that Either Representation Was False and Therefore Cannot Establish that He will Probably Prevail on Defamation or Negligent Misrepresentation

Plaintiff Golob’s claims also are not probable to succeed, even if the statement “checkered
past” was not an opinion, because truth is an absolute defense. *Francis v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.*
(1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 535, 540; *Carver v. Bonds* (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 328, 351.

Plaintiff Golob seeks, by sleight of hand, to argue that the alleged representation (which
was not put in evidence) that he had a “history of litigation” was something bigger. In his brief,
Golob in effect argues that what was stated was that he had history of *losing* litigation. But that
was not the alleged statement in his complaint (and competent proof of the writing was not
presented). The complaint alleges the statement was a “history of litigation.” This statement was
proven true by attachments of numerous lawsuits and references thereto involving Golob and his
Butterfly Fitness franchisor being sued by numerous franchisees, as well as earlier litigation and
the Butterfly Fitness bankruptcy. (Decl. of Sean Kelly, 03/13/14, Paras.11-14, 25-27, Exs. B-E, I,
J-1, J-2, K,). Judicial knowledge was requested of these court pleadings and not opposed.
Moreover, Golob’s own declaration admits to these lawsuits, but argues they were settled or that
he otherwise did not lose. (Golob Decl. Para. 14., *see also*, Golob MPA, p. 6, l. 11 admitting “a
handful of lawsuits”). There is a history of litigation, and Golob has zero chance of prevailing on
this claim.

1 Plaintiff Golob cannot establish that the assertion of a “checkered past” is false even if it
2 is not an inactionable opinion. Golob was the subject of fraud claims by prior franchisees,
3 including a verified complaint (Decl. of Sean Kelly, 03/13/14, Paras. 9-15, 26, Ex. A-G, J-1, J-2).
4 Golob received innumerable comments in the blog which he did not answer. Also, having the
5 ability to settle cases or outlast plaintiffs, does not rebut the multiple franchisees stating they lost
6 their savings and investments in Golob’s franchise. Indeed, missing from Golob’s declaration is
7 any defense of his conduct in not refunding fitness center memberships on closing, reimbursing
8 franchisees like Jeff Marks who had six figure losses from purchasing Golob’s Butterfly Life
9 franchises, or even what happened to the Butterfly Fitness business that had to file for
10 bankruptcy. Golob’s own submission regarding his corporate bankruptcy indicates the court
11 dismissed his company bankruptcy filing for failing to comply with court order. (Golob Decl., Ex.
12 3). Golob has no probability of establishing that the “checkered past” and “history of litigation”
13 representations were false, and cannot establish actionable defamation. *See, Fountain v. First*
Reliance Bank (Sup. Ct. S.C. 2012) 730 S.E.2d 305, 310 (“checkered past” representation held
not actionable).

14 Plaintiff Golob has not established actual malice required for his defamation claims. *See,*
15 *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 269.

16 3. The Statute of Limitations Has Run

17 Plaintiff Golob makes one desperate argument seeking to avoid the statute of limitations,
18 namely claiming re-publication of the “checkered past” and “history of litigation” statements
19 sometime in January of 2014. To manufacture this argument he cites a single case as providing
20 that re-publication of a defamatory book recommences the statute of limitations. *See, Shively v.*
Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230.

21 Nowhere in his opposition does Golob deny the fact that the exact defamatory statements
22 which he challenges were published by Sean Kelly in 2008 and 2009. Moreover, Golob suggests
23 these two offensive statements were taken down, but does not prove this happened. To the
24 contrary, Sean Kelly unequivocally stated in his initial declaration that the publication has
25 remained unchanged from 2008 and 2009, subject to additional bloggers adding entries down
26 below. (Kelly Decl., 03/13/14, Para. 16, Ex. F; Kelly Reply Decl., Paras. 8-26, Ex. O). What
27 follows from Sean Kelly’s complete and supported declaration is that the statute of limitations ran
28 years ago for these alleged defamatory remarks under the single publication rule. Civil Code
Section 3425.3 (one year defamation) Civil Procedure Section 339 (two years negligent

1 misrepresentation); *Strick v. Superior Court* (1983) 143 Cal. App. 3d 916, 922-23; *Shively v.*
2 *Bozanich* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230 (California follows single publication rule); *Traditional Cat*
3 *Association, Inc. v. Gilbreath* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 392.

4 Desperate to avoid the statute of limitations bar, Golob claims in his declaration that Sean
5 Kelly republished the “checkered past” and “history of litigation” remarks “in about” January of
6 2014, and adds that these remarks were elevated to the title rather than in blog text. (Golob Decl.
7 Para. 8). But Golob fails to attach – or provide any proof – of this asserted new and most recent
8 re-publication. Sean Kelly has denied such re-publication in his original and reply declarations
9 and established that the original publications were not republished in January of 2014. Moreover,
10 the failure of Golob to attach the asserted re-publication with altered text, is telling. Such text is
11 the best evidence and could be examined forensically to establish its authenticity, if in fact it did
12 not establish that it was indeed what had been published years earlier in 2008 and 2009. In sum,
13 Golob’s deliberate lack of proof establishes that he is not probable of overcoming the statute of
14 limitations defense.

13 **III. CONCLUSION**

14 For the foregoing reasons, defendant Sean Kelly requests that the Court grant his anti-
15 SLAPP special motion and strike the first and second causes of action, comprising the entire
16 complaint of Plaintiff Mark Golob. The prayer seeking \$35 million dollars exemplifies the in
17 terrorem purpose of the lawsuit seeking to chill defendant Kelly’s first amendment rights and his
18 reporting of franchisor actions to the public. Defendant Kelly further requests that the Court
19 award his attorney’s fees and costs in an amount to be determined in a separate motion.

20 DATED: April 2, 2014

LAGARIAS LAW OFFICES

21 By: 
22 Peter C. Lagarias, Esq.
23 Attorney for Defendant Kelly
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